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US succeeds in Beirut: now for the future



The PLO withdrawal from Beirut, supervised by an international peacekeeping force, is first and foremost a success for US diplomacy.

The United States has succeeded in forestalling a total destruction of the PLO, which would have been unacceptable to the Arab states, while allowing Israel to achieve its war target.

The Israeli objective was to end the PLO's political and military presence in Lebanon, a country the Palestinians had controlled for 12 years.

Israel showed by its heavy bombing raids on Beirut that it was not going to budge an inch from this target, but it was prepared to give the US peace mission a chance.

If the PLO could have been evacuated from Beirut by other means, Israel would not have had to take Beirut by storm.

Soon after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon the Arab states showed they had no intention of jeopardising their own security by actively supporting the PLO or trying to rescue it.

They made the United States responsible for arriving at a solution of the conflict that was still just about in keeping with Arab interests.

They called on the United States to play in full the intermediary role it assumed in the Middle East under Dr Kissinger in the early 70s.

In other words, they said America must justify its role as Israel's protecting power by moderating Israel's political intentions to an extent clearly apparent to Arab eyes.

It was this interplay of interests that made the US mediation bid possible, and in common with all bids of its kind ran the risk of failure if both sides maintained demands that were too ...

The United States succeeded at the last minute in making it clear to both that there were strict limits to what a mediation bid could hope to achieve.

The Soviet Union was able to wield no influence on negotiations. No Arab state volunteered to side with the Russians in bringing the situation even to a head.

It would have given Moscow an opportunity of stepping in as a responsible power in the Middle East and possibly aiming at some kind of US-Soviet equilibrium in the region.

Besides, the Soviet Union was unable to prove that it could influence US policy in any way short of heading for a confrontation between the great powers. And that would have been in no Arab interest, either.

Russia twice warned the United States not to deploy US troops in Lebanon, yet US forces will still from part of the international peacekeeping force to supervise the PLO withdrawal from Beirut and police the ceasefire in and around the city.

The use of a peacekeeping force made up of French, Italian and US units is also a defeat for the United States. It has formally been called in at the request of the Lebanese government to cooperate with the Lebanese army, or what is left of it.

In fact it owes its existence to Israel's refusal to accept a peacekeeping force under UN authority. This is the price the United Nations has had to pay for its consistent majority votes against Israel.

The UN is not felt in Israel to enjoy the confidence an impartial organisation deserves, while in Arab eyes too the existing UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon has not been useful or effective.

Politically the United Nations has been equally ineffective, although the UN Security Council and General Assembly have provided both the Soviet Union and some Arab extremists, not to mention everyone who wanted to convey the impression of having a say in what went on in the Middle East, with an *ersatz* war theatre.

But resolutions passed from time to time were outdated by the results of US mediation and felt by the Arab parties to the conflict to be very little use to them either.

In the wake of the Lebanon war and the turn for the better it has taken for the time being there is sure to be greater pressure on the United States to pursue a dynamic policy and grasp the opportunity of arriving at an overall solution in the Middle East.

Soviet diplomatic activity will also call for an overall solution in the hope that it will be impossible and that the call will boomerang on the Americans.

In fact the linkage of what are taken to be Arab and Israel interests respectively to arrive at a theoretical overall solution not only holds little prospect of success; at times it could even trigger explosions.

So we shall have to wait and see what

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(Cartoon: Felix Mussil/Frankfurter Rundschau)

Nuclear deterrent: planning for the unthinkable

A Pentagon report describing how the United States could wage a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, and win, has been leaked.

Newspaper reports say it is a draft strategic overall plan for a war lasting up to six months.

This new nuclear planning, if Mr Reagan were actually to adopt it, would leave not only opponents of nuclear weapons gasping for breath.

Admittedly, US defence policy remains expressly geared to the defensive in response to an attack. Also, as Defence Secretary Weinberger's annual report for 1982 puts it, "strategic planning for a counter-attack is not provocative."

But it remains a paradoxical feature of the deterrent concept that in the final analysis the capacity to fight is the only guarantee of not needing to do so.

The latest Pentagon plans go far beyond this, however. They appear to replace a strategy of preventing war by one of waging war, and a nuclear war at that.

This assumption becomes a virtual certainty when the proposed extension of civil defence precautions is borne in mind.

An initial $4.2bn is allocated toward the cost of precautions to ensure that in an emergency 150 million Americans can be evacuated from the vicinity of 63 major military installations, 330 other military and industrial facilities and all cities with a population of over 50,000.

Some military men obviously believe a nuclear war can be won. The civil defence officials with their simple bureaucratic minds seem to feel the public could survive. Both make a nuclear war more probable.

These US plans, no matter how tentative, affect the security interests of Western Europe in general and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular in three respects.

First, the mere idea of a long drawn-out war is frightening. It doesn't matter if it is nuclear or conventional. Alternating waves of attack and defence would devastate Germany and threaten its national substance.

The deployment of modern conventional weapons would be bad enough, as the fighting in Beirut has shown; nuclear weapons would be worse.

In the interest of survival Western strategy must be aimed at a swift outcome, via escalation or armistice talks or capitulation. The fighting cannot be allowed to last more than 3 to 10 days.

Second, there can be no question of an overdeployment of nuclear weapons in densely-populated Europe.

As long as selected, demonstrative, deliberate single strokes merely underscore the proximity of America's full-scale retaliation potential Moscow may be deterred and the link between Europe and North America underlined.

But if lengthy phases of tactical nu-

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
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■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Moscow looks at Bonn as the ace in the pack



Moscow has always seen the Federal Republic as the weak link in the Nato chain.

Speculation about dissent over the *Ostpolitik* interests of Nato partners has been part of the strategic arsenal of Soviet foreign policy for decades.

But it has become specially important since Bonn began to conclude treaties with the East Bloc countries in the 70s.

Seldom has so much play been made with this strategic ploy in Moscow and, in consultation with Moscow, in East Berlin as of late.

A GDR diplomat recently outlined the East Bloc's political plan target for the 80s as being to split Nato down the middle and drive a strategic wedge between America and Europe.

The Federal Republic and its relationship with the GDR is envisaged as playing a key role in this process.

"Peaceful and fruitful relations between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe" are the objective of Soviet policy.

This was the formula used in commentaries by the SED, the politbureau and the central committee on the Crimean talks between Mr Brezhnev and Herr Honecker, the East German leader.

East Berlin leaves little doubt where *it sees the weak link in the Western alliance.* "In any solution of European security problem," it writes, "the Federal Republic of Germany could have a tangible part to play."

Express reference is made to intra-German ties in this context: "Its (i.e. Bonn's) good-neighbourly relations with the socialist states, including those between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, are jeopardised by the intention of stationing hundreds of new US nuclear missiles in West Germany."

This is clearly the current agitation slogan and the yardstick of all political comments about the Federal Republic.

The SED publishes daily pointers from Soviet sources and sources of its own to alleged conflicts of interest between Washington and Bonn.

They are said to be particularly at oods over the Soviet gas pipeline contract and the Nato missile modernisation resolution.

The Soviet news agency *Novosti* set the key:

"In the Soviet Union the resolute stand taken by the Federal Republic and other West European countries is appreciated, given the heavy pressure by Washington to reduce trade with the East, including the USSR, to cancel the gas pipeline contract and to abandon the process of detente."

To avoid domestic misunderstanding that might divert attention from the policy of strict demarcation, all German politicians who fail to fit into the picture of a conflict of interests between Washington and Bonn come in for even more trenchant attack.

The Christian Democrats are under heavy fire, as at times is Foreign Minister Genscher, a Free Democrat, and CDU Bundestag MP Alois Mertes in particular.

Herr Mertes is rapped for supporting unwarranted US bids to bring about cancellation of the gas pipeline contract.

The GDR is keen to create the impression that the effect of the US embargo on trade ties, including intra-German trade, has been nil.

East Berlin notes that intra-German trade is looking up and likely to total a record DM13bn this year.

Friedhelm Kemna

(Die Welt, 20 August 1982)

Planning for the unthinkable

Continued from page 1

clear warfare in Europe were envisaged without triggering full-scale retaliation, it would be tantamount to decoupling.

Third, any idea that nuclear warfare could be controlled, dosed or limited, let alone won, is absolutely suicidal. John F. Kennedy's comment that victory would leave an ashen taste in the mouth is still valid.

The uncertainties of nuclear war are great; its dynamics would be unpredictable. Nuclear weapons must remain *political* weapons; they are not universal remedies.

The nuclear deterrent theory must not be reconsidered as a nuclear war practice. We may think the unthinkable but there is no cause to plan it.

The Reagan administration took office 18 months ago with fairly extreme defence policy concepts, especially the idea that nuclear wars are limitable, wageable and winnable.

But, when America's allies voiced dissatisfaction and failed to appreciate the US viewpoint, it held its fire for a while.

But now Washington is back to beavering away at concepts as to how the United States might prevail in longer nuclear hostilities.

It wants not only to prevent the enemy from winning but to win itself and casts to the wind the dreadful warning that whatever happens the survivors will envy the dead.

This is grist to the mill of the European peace movement, which has marked time since Mr Reagan was pressured by many quarters into holding disarmament talks with the Soviet Union.

And the peace movement will not be alone in raising the alarm. There are sure to be fresh outbreaks of tension in the Atlantic alliance.

The Europeans cannot afford to let Washington simply impose this new Nato military doctrine on them.

Theo Sommer

(Die Zeit, 20 August 1982)

Russians fear capacity of US technology

The Americans are negotiating under pressure at Start (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in Geneva. They are keen to demonstrate to an alarmed public in Europe and America that they mean business when they talk of nuclear arms limitation.

In many articles by leading Soviet commentators President Reagan's refusal to continue negotiations on nuclear test limitation is said to be symptomatic of the anti-Soviet attitude of the US government.

The treaties and agreements involved are those banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. As an exception underground nuclear tests were still to be permitted.

Two nuclear powers, France and China, are not parties to the test ban treaties. So a comprehensive new agreement covering and, if at all possible, banning all nuclear tests was an obvious target.

The Americans have now quit the talks, with Defence Secretary Weinberger arguing that "they weaken our determination to press ahead with nuclear armament."

Soviet commentators say the US "no" to a nuclear arms freeze and a test ban is due to the comprehensive nuclear modernisation programme on which President Reagan has decided.

It is to include the MX intercontinental missile, the Trident 1 and 2 on board nuclear subs and long-range Cruise missiles being fitted out with nuclear warheads.

There is an important reason for the current Press campaign in Moscow. With the swift pace of technological development in nuclear weapon systems Russia runs a risk of falling behind the Americans.

This comes at a time when a breathless Moscow felt it had established approximate parity in intercontinental nuclear capacity.

The aim is now not to deploy more systems. Salt 2 may not have been ratified by the United States but both sides have chosen to abide by the ceilings it agreed. Better systems are what now counts.

Moscow undoubtedly fears the full-scale technological effort President Reagan has ordered the Pentagon to undertake.

America's potential for technological development is simply greater, and not just in pipeline-laying machinery, turbines and compressors.

Declared intentions of setting up killer satellite systems in space, which sooner or later will be equipped with nuclear warheads, shows that a new generation of weapons is in the offing that will make land-based stationary large missiles superfluous.

Given overkill capacity and new technological developments talks between the Americans and Russians on limitation yardsticks are more urgent than ever before.

But the atmosphere of ties between them is so overcast that the nuclear sector is not the only one in which no headway is being made.

In research and technology, the economy and the arts all agreements reached in the detente era under Presidents Nixon and Ford have either been cancelled or allowed to lapse.

Peter Seidlitz

(Kieler Nachrichten, 16 August 1982)

After Beirut

Continued from page 1

shape the Middle East mosaic takes af- ter the PLO withdrawal from the Leba- nese capital.

First, for instance, can agreement be reached between opposing factions in Lebanon, factions that have maintained strict hostility in view of the PLO presence in the country, thereby establishing an accepted political authority?

Second, can a further withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon be negotiated? PLO units are still stationed in the north. In the east, in the Bekaa valley, there are the Syrians. In the south and extending as far north as Beirut there are the Israelis.

As Lebanese authority is gradu[ally] extended efforts will have to be made [to] persuade all these forces to withdraw.

But it could well be that central government authority is restored solely in Beirut, thereby restoring Lebanon's international legal existence, whereas the rest of the country is subdivided into protectorates.

An even more important factor for the future will be the direction the PLO takes. The transfer of PLO units to a variety of Arab countries, such as Syria, Jordan and Iraq will to begin with rule out a PLO joint military command.

It cannot be in all these countries' interest for the PLO to set itself up as a state within a state; it has certainly not been so in the past.

So the Arab countries will be trying with all the means at their command to keep these PLO groups under control, concentrate them in certain camps and only display them as a weapon when they are called on to support the Palestinian cause.

Even so, the Palestinians can be fanatical fighters, as the battle for Beirut showed. They could present their host countries with serious problems and force them to allow the PLO to launch certain moves against Israel.

This would certainly promptly refuel the fires of the Middle East conflict.

An equally significant factor will be the future behaviour of the present, and maybe future, PLO leaders.

Mr Arafat and his PLO leadership are likely to head for Tunisia to av[oid] too strict controls by other Arab go- vernments.

The PLO leadership will then have to decide whether it is able and willing to draw conclusions from its military de- feat in Lebanon.

Will it be prepared to limit itself to political representation of the Palesti- nians in a peace and negotiation pro- cess? If it is, it will need to credibly mo- derate its targets.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 22 August 1982)

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HOME AFFAIRS

On a cerebral note, more effort needed

[T]here is too little thinking taking place in politics. Much of the talk [re]ally concerns the timing of the next [elect]ion with a view to catching [vote]s... that is if we are lucky.

If we are unlucky, the concern is [with] preserving positions and party [posts]. In other words: plain party ego- [tism].

[T]here is little clarity on issues and [flash]-in-the-pan deeds are passed off as [state]smanship.

[W]hen Chancellor Helmut Schmidt [disc]overed the missile gap in the second [half] of the 1970s, he still drew conclu[sions] from it — conclusions that were [fav]ourable and indicated a sensible ob- [jective]: the superpowers were so absor- [bed] with their Salt negotiations that [the]y overlooked the equally dangerous [medi]um-range missiles that worried the [Euro]peans most.

The idea was to change this. But the [dou]ble Nato decision that followed sent [the] Alliance into a tailspin because the [aspect] of negotiations was overlaid by [the] decision to boost the Euromissile [pot]ential.

[T]he coalition parties in Bonn found [them]selves in trouble and it was finally [the] peace movement that articulated [what] the government should have made [clear].

[T]he controversial Nato decision [achiev]ed the opposite of what was had [inten]ded because it was sloppily formu- [lated] and not *fully* thought out. So, in- [stead] of negotiating disarmament we [are fa]ced with yet another arms race.

[An]d when a CDU politician — like [the] intelligent Professor Kurt Bieden- [kopf] — starts thinking aloud about the [...] of current strategic doctrines, [...] to the protests of the peace [move]ment and warning of the loss of [cred]ibility of the deterrence theory, his [own] fellow party members put him on [the c]arpet.

[It] is thus evidently no longer accepta- [ble] to point to the booby traps of the [bala]nce of power principle and the [weakne]sses of the strategic concepts of [the] superpowers.

In fact, even the Social Democrats [and] the Liberals, who still agree on [fore]ign policy and whose line of argu- [ment] is similar to Biedenkopf's, failed [to co]me to his defence.

So even pondering one's own mista- [kes] seems to be frowned upon among [polit]icians. Still, there can be no doubt [that] many an SPD man secretly praised [the] CDU professor.

[An]d since the preservation of the coa- [lition] at any cost has absolute priority, [Will]y Brandt's party shirks even discus- [sion] about issues that affect its very [exist]ence without clichés. Polemicising [with] generalities is, after all, so much [more] comfortable.

[Th]is kind of wishy-washy debating is [all the] more surprising considering that a [seri]ous debate would provide a chance [for im]age-building and shaping a new [ima]ge without the danger of talking [vote]rs into the ground.

[It] can hardly have escaped the Social [Dem]ocrats, who head the government, [that] the Geneva talks between the su- [perp]owers aimed at a limiting medium- [range] missiles have bogged down.

[T]he Moscow Politburo seems to have [entren]ched itself and be preparing for hibernation. The rigid Marxist-Leninists in the Soviet Union now clearly pin their hopes on Reagan's successor, which does not exactly speak for their realism.

Even if Ronald Reagan decided not to stand again or if the Americans voted him out, the developments until then will have created a great many new factors that will make it even harder to agree on arms limitation.

It can therefore be assumed that in the near future the Bonn government — whoever that may be — will have to cope with an even larger protest potential.

This is so not only because of the delicacy of the arms issue but also because the conflict between ecology and economy continues to grow.

The established parties are alarmed at how easily the Greens are winning rotes. They should have woken up earlier and dealt with the root of the problem.

But what happened is that sound environmental ideas of the Social/Liberal coalition were not pursued further — a costly mistake.

Now, everybody is scrabbling to salvage what can still be salvaged; and the first cabinet meeting after the summer recess will devote a whole day to ecology issues, i.e. the Green challenge.

Anybody who misses the right moment for creative decisions becomes the prey rather than the hunter. There is clearly a need for more thinking.

But the conservatives are in even worse shape. They made it too easy on themselves from the very beginning and found it simpler and more comfortable to verbally attack the Greens from a safe shelter.

Only Heiner Geissler (who, like Biedenkopf, sometimes acts as the thought provoker of the CDU) risks stepping into the public arena and calling for a "tougher course" on environmental policy.

But he is ignored and his party chairman, Helmut Kohl, prefers to keep silent.

And since the Greens are capturing more and more SPD and FDP voters (which could catapult the SPD out of government and the FDP out of the Bundestag) both parties are panicking.

Moreover, it is very difficult to take action out of a defensive position. The scope is simply too narrow.

This is why belated thinking, no matter at and on what point, will achieve little.

Helmut Bauer

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 19 August 1982)

A Social Democrat makes a clean breast of it

The Social Democrats were too late anticipating the social and economic consequences of the world-wide economic crisis, says the party's national business manager, Peter Glotz.

He says the social security system is based on a faster growth rate than today's. That is why it is not working as it should.

He admitted in a remarkable interview that the SPD crisis is the fault of both the party itself and the government.

His admissions, coming on the eve of a massive trade union protest, are risky ones for a Social Democrat.

The points he made, however, are worth serious discussion. But the reactions to them have been turned to political advantage.

For example, Friedrich Zimmermann, leader of the CSU in the Bundestag, could think of nothing better to say than that Glotz had confirmed that the Chancellor had been deceiving the public for too longer over the seriousness of the situation.

That is not the only recent example of political reactions to ideas that deserved better.

Two prominent Christian Democrats expressed some equally risky ideas: Deputy CDU chairman Kurt Biedenkopf again publicly warned of the danger inherent in the nuclear deterrence strategy while CDU Secretary-General Heiner Geissler called for stiff laws to prevent industry from creating further havoc in the environment.

But there was no serious discussion of these ideas. All that happened was that a CSU defence expert gave Biedenkopf a piece of his mind, saying that his ideas were "not only politically gauche but also dangerous."

Geissler met with no response in his own party. That was probably the most merciful attitude he could have hoped for considering that the CDU blames our economic crisis on the SPD due to the stiff and costly environmental protection safeguards it has imposed on industry.

The FDP sees its salvation in a conflict with the SPD which wants socialism although all would be well again if only "framework conditions" for free enterprise were improved.

And as to the Greens, they feel that the best way of capturing votes is to act as if the take-over of vacant houses by squatters were the most important task of all.

Most of what is being said and argued about is grotesquely out of proportion with the world-wide dimension of the crisis.

It is naturally the opposition's business to attack the government while it is the government's business to predict the beginning of the end should the opposition come to power.

But in our present situation, it is tantamount to taking the public for a fool to pretend that the crisis could be overcome if only the citizens voted for the right party.

Several other news items make it obvious that the crisis is not home-made and can therefore not be cured with home remedies.

Growth rates are limping along even in communist countries where, according to ideology, there can be no recession. This is reserved for capitalist systems.

In China, the growth rate has dropped from seven to three per cent.

The GDR, until recently, had been

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(Cartoon: Felix Mussil/Frankfurter Rundschau)

SPD: minefields on both sides

The SPD leader in the Bundestag, Herbert Wehner, is being optimistic in hoping that nobody will ever drive a wedge between the Social Democrats and the trade unions, no matter how hard the times.

If the autumn protest demonstrations by the trade unions do take place, the SPD will not be described as the class enemy. But since it is jointly responsible for this and next year's budget cuts, it will be hardest hit by union criticism.

SPD members and trade unionists are already showing signs of political schizophrenia caused by the need to criticise the government's fiscal policy and at the same time show understanding for it.

The SPD is faced with an insoluble dilemma: it wants to remain in government in Bonn as long as possible, so it must make concessions to its coalition partner, the FDP. But trade unionists will not support the FDP for a third or fourth time.

If the SPD took the trade union line, it would risk not only its position in government but also a dispute in its own ranks.

On Treasury policy, the party consists of both traditionalists and progressives.

The progressives regard curbing social security spending as necessary to consolidate the budget. This is also the FDP line. The progressives also want to deal with the issue of public sector debt and state demand with as little ideology as possible.

It is debatable whether there is much difference when it comes down to brass tacks between two such dyed-in-the-wool Social Democrats as Glotz and Roth.

Roth, an out-and-out sceptic on the future of the SPD as a government party, does not want to lose the trade unions. Glotz, on the other hand, is already preparing the unions for the next difficult compromise.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 August 1982)

■ DEFENCE

Warsaw Pact and Nato: logistics of a war-time chessboard

War, says Egon Bahr, is no longer the *ultima ratio*; it has become the *ultima irratio* of history. Kurt Biedenkopf has much the same idea in mind when he refers to the concept of a nuclear borderline situation.

Both politicians, the Social Democrat and the Christian Democrat, sense how much thinking in nuclear age categories ovetaxes the powers of the man in the street.

What they wonder is how long people will be able to live with the idea that for the first time in history the world's arms stockpiles are enough to wipe out the entire globe and with it mankind.

Both arrive, via different routes, at the conclusion that survival can only be guaranteed in the long term by dropping out of the arms race.

Below this particular level of political philosophy, at which there is a far-reaching consensus on the need for disarmament, the pundits juggle with all manner of figures as they ponder over the balance of power between the blocs.

Much though everyone may be agreed that arms control must lead eventually to a genuine reduction in armaments, views differ widely on the steps that must first be taken.

The latest survey by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a stablemate of the Social Democratic Party, even calls into question one of the most frequent claims by Western strategists and politicians.

It casts doubt on the claim that the Warsaw Pact enjoys conventional superiority over Nato.

The bulky survey was compiled by Brig. Christian Krause (retd), who spent many years at the Defence Ministry in Bonn, where he was responsible for Nato operational planning in Central Europe, and later supervised work on strategic concepts for the Bundeswehr.

He notes that in all comparisons between Nato and the Warsaw Pact only estimates are available for the East, and assumes that maximum figures, not mean estimates, are invariably listed.

Yet even if the figures are accurate as quoted, contradictions arise. Brig. Krause refers to the 1975/76 defence white paper, in which the East was said to enjoy clear conventional superiority.

The 27 Nato divisions were said to face 88 Warsaw Pact divisions. The West had 6,100 tanks in Central Europe; the East had over 27,000. The West had 1,700 military aircraft to the East's 3,750.

The conclusions reached were that the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a superiority of three to one in divisions, four-and-a-half to one in tanks and over two to one in aircraft.

Krause wonders how true these claims were. The French armed forces were not included in the 1975 figures, whereas Soviet troops stationed in Byelorussia, the Baltic and the Carpathians were.

The 1979 white paper was based on a different approach. Its figures included the French armed forces but disregarded Soviet troops stationed outside Central Europe.

The result was an entirely different set of ratios. Nato's 43 divisions faced the Warsaw Pact's 58, or 1.3 to one. Nato's 7,500 tanks faced the Warsaw Pact's 19,000, or 2.3 to one. Nato's 2,230 aircraft faced the Warsaw Pact's 2,800, or nearly level-pegging.

Even these figures by no means tell the whole story, Brig. Krause adds. They disregard the fact that Soviet divisions are smaller than their Nato counterparts.

At full operational strength a mechanised Nato division has about 21,000 men, whereas a Soviet division has between 11,000 per tank division and 13,000 per motorised infantry division.

That, he says, is why experts work not in terms of divisions but of division equivalents.

If that had been done in the 1979 white paper, readers would have discovered to their surprise that Nato enjoyed a slight superiority over the Warsaw Pact in division equivalents.

The customary reference to numbers of main battle tanks does not impress him either. The number of tanks cannot be taken as an expression of fighting strength.

"How can you send so many tanks into action with so few men?" he asks, referring to German experience in the Second World War.

Militarily successful panzer divisions in World War II consisted of a tank regiment, two armoured infantry regiments, artillery, pioneers, and other support units, not to mention logistical facilities.

This variety, says Brig. Krause, was what made German panzer divisions so flexible in the Second World War.

The Soviet Union relies on a diametrically opposite organisation principle. Its current tank divisions consist of three tank regiments and only one armoured infantry regiment, plus very little in the way of support units.

"A division of this kind will roll cumbersomely straight toward the next tank obstacle, be it a minefield or a river with a steep embankment," he writes.

"There it will draw helplessly to a halt, easy prey to anti-tank firepower that has been increased tremendously since the last war."

This emphasis on tanks is due, he feels, to the Soviet view of the shape of war to come.

Moscow's strategy is based on the assumption that the West will launch an attack that it will immediately counter with a crushing nuclear missile counter-attack. Then the tank armies will be sent into the field.

Nato may have fewer tanks when figures are compared, but that is due not to the West's inability to increase the number of tanks it runs but to a different tactical concept.

A regional view is inadequate to assess the situation in any case. The global balance of power is just as important in the event of war, and in this context he feels the West is well ahead:

"It commands the seas and thus the world's commodity resources. Its resources are far superior in the event of a war.

"The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can rely only on its own territory and on smaller European countries in the event of war in Europe: the countries forming its sphere of influence."

What possible military options does the East have, he asks. As he sees it there are only two:

● a combined nuclear and conventional attack, or pre-emptive strike, from which only the threat of retaliation has a deterrent effect, or

● a conventional full-scale attack, or surprise attack.

Neither calls for more than a conventional defence option with special provisions such as adequate reconnaissance and suitable stationing of units to rule out a surprise attack.

Given the geographical extent of Central Europe, about 500 miles from the Baltic to the Alps, he reckons about 30 divisions are needed to establish an interlinked defence front.

Nato currently has 28 or 29 divisions available, but in the event of tension the United States could be expected to lift US divisions across the Atlantic and France to send several French divisions into Germany.

Between them these forces should be sufficient to ward off the first wave of an attack from the East.

A critical situation would only arise if the other side were to succeed in sending a second wave on to the attack. Nato strategy would then no longer rule out the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

But Brig. Krause sees distinct possibilities of preventing the formation of a second wave of attacking forces from the East, which would have to consist of the 30 Soviet divisions stationed in the western military regions of Russia and moved about 600 miles west.

He rules out an airlift of Soviet heavy armour, so the Russians would have to rely on road and rail links with particularly vulnerable junctions at bridges over the Vistula and the Oder.

The West could knock out this network by means of long-range weapons, especially as only about 20 priority targets would be involved.

Nato, he says, ha the weapon systems needed to accomplish this task. Crucial technical breakthroughs have been achieved lately in this particular sector.

Nato's conventional forces in Central Europe, he concludes, are sufficient to prevent a *fait accompli*. There can also be no doubt that the nuclear deterrent is effective.

So he calls for an end to constant laments about the East being militarily superior. They are, he says, due to a deliberate pessimism that calls the deterrent into question and is detrimental to security.

He has a distinct warning to political parties:

"When politicians start looking at security problems solely from a military angle they are too easily liable to turn a blind eye to important political opportunities of safeguarding peace."

Joachim Worthmann

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 14 August 1982)

A second look at the battle strategies

The debate on Nato strategy to ward off a Warsaw Pact attack continues, and it is increasingly clear that some weapons do not help this strategy.

The reference is to forward-based short-range systems, or tactical nuclear weapons. If they were ever used, it would be the first step toward a nuclear holocaust.

If they had to be withdrawn further behind the front line they would be aimed at the country they were supposed to be protecting.

They made sense as long as the massive retaliation strategy applied, but it was replaced by the flexible response in the 60s. Tactical nuclear weapons are now a handicap.

Other strategic problems are also under intensive discussion. Is the United States really prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend the West in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack, for instance?

Any such decision would be sure, given that the Soviet Union could be expected to launch a counter-attack, to affect America too. So no US President could seriously consider using nuclear systems, it is argued.

Nuclear systems would thus forfeit efficacy as political weapons. Conventional armament would then hold the key, and here the Warsaw Pact is said to enjoy superiority.

To be truly credible, conventional forces would need to be reinforced in conjunction with new operational considerations, including long- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

Nato's conventional defences must become more credible than they are at present, and one way of ensuring this is to set one's sights at the weak spots in the Warsaw Pact's strategy.

Warsaw Pact plans are based on the need for any advance to the west to bring about a swift decision, a lightning strike penetrating Nato's forward defences at points unknown to the West.

This strategy envisages wave after wave of Soviet units being sent to the fore, but basically there are only two waves in being.

The first is deployed in the East Bloc's forefield, the second in Byelorussia, the Baltic and the Carpathians.

Given a modicum of early warning and political decisions taken in good time, especially the decision to mobilise, Nato would be in a position to … the first operational wave and keep the second under control.

Nato has accordingly taken measures to ensure improvements in existing non-nuclear armour, using micro-electronics to boost target accuracy.

Using an aircraft on a single mission or a missle, 60 per cent of a tank company can be destroyed. These new systems are almost on a par with the destructive power of small nuclear weapons, which can thus be replaced.

Many Bonn politicians are currently considering what changes this might entail. Christian Democrat Manfred Wörner says consistent utilisation of modern weapons technology would no longer oblige Nato to make early use of nuclear weapons.

Professor Biedenkopf has talked in terms of surmounting the nuclear borderline situation.

One crucial conclusion that has been reached is that the new weapons, in conjunction with operational considerations, could make it possible to neutralise a substantial proportion of Soviet units before nuclear weapons are deployed.

Helmut Berndt

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 13 August 1982)

■ PEOPLE

The intellectual exercises of Kurt Biedenkopf

The West's defence strategy no longer provides the answers the younger generation seeks, says Kurt Biedenkopf, one of the chief thinkers of the CDU.

He says that because the peace movement is spreading like wildfire, the West must look again at defence strategy.

Herr Biedenkopf is fond of putting forward ideas that upset the conservatives. And they cannot possible have liked this latest suggestion.

But the immediate reaction has been … because people are away for summer holidays. It is hard to convert seaside relaxation into harsh political criticism.

It is also possible that some of Biedenkopf's fellow party members think that he is just running over some old ideas again.

As far back as last October, Biedenkopf said publicly that the essence of the West's defence strategy was incapable of achieving consensus in the long run. It would have to be scrapped.

That criticism didn't come in the summer. And it was just before the CDU national congress in Hamburg. A heated debate resulted.

At the conference, Biedenkopf did not exactly depart from his idea, but he was restrained in presenting it. It was as if he wanted only a discussion.

Many delegates though that he had not fully thought out his case. No one got the impression that he actually wanted to change policy.

Biedenkopf's ideas are intellectually brilliant and have a touch of the original. They often contradict party policy and sometimes amount to an attack on the leadership. Naturally, the party resists.

His support comes from outside the party, especially the Press. In the end, however, he gives the impression that all he seeks is to start discussion, that what happens to his ideas is not important to him.

He has no real position of power, so it would be difficult for him to convert his ideas into policy.

The national CDU is in the opposition as it is in North Rhine-Westphalia, where Biedenkopf is the party's chairman. And it so happens that deeds are denied to the opposition. All that remains to it is talk — usually ineffectual talk.

But the impression Biedenkopf makes is that even if he were in power he would still prefer to propound ideas rather than make policy.

Some who have known him for years regard him as a politician by profession rather than vocation. In conversation he is frequently referred to as being apolitical.

It happens time and again that Biedenkopf addresses a high-calibre audience on fundamentals of economic policy. Everybody listens attentively; there is rousing applause and no end of praise. It was "a brilliant speech, full of interesting ideas and fine formulations," or "he is the best brain the CDU has."

But was it really a politician's speech? Everybody is helpless when it comes to analysing why the speech was apolitical.

There are those who say: It's a bit too intellectual. Others remember that Biedenkopf is a university professor and that it obviously shows. Yet others ask themselves if there is enough of a will to fight it out and bring about the political realisation of his ideas.

Beware of making a mistake here. Biedenkopf has political ambitions; he even has ambition to hold office, which is evident in his very bearing and gestures.

You just have to watch him approaching the lectern with quick, determined steps, forward thrusting arms and head held high. Nor is he a quitter.

Would he otherwise have tangled with the powerful CDU chairman, Helmut Kohl, while still general secretary of the party in Bonn?

In this case, Biedenkopf lost and had to relinquish the post. He passed the interim by getting his bearings and preparing for things to come as a member of the Bonn Bundestag.

As chairman of the Bundestag economic affairs committee he frequently demonstrated his expertise and eloquence.

Biedenkopf then went to North Rhine-Westphalia to succeed Heinrich Köppler as opposition leader after the latter's death. But he is still far removed from his aim of becoming prime minister of the state.

Should he ever make it and settle in Düsseldorf, thus forfeiting the idea of continuing his march on Bonn, people would again say that he is not a full-blooded politician.

But if he were to use the post as prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia as a springboard for Bonn, he would be accused of having no staying



Kurt Biedenkopf ... man of 'original' ideas. (Photo: Marianne von der Lancken)

power and being constantly driven from one office to the next.

This view has been somewhat softened because he has been involved primarily with Düsseldorf for the past few years.

There is some truth to all these views, and Biedenkopf himself has contributed something to them.

But there is also a widespread tendency to cling to a Biedenkopf image at any cost, despite the fact that certain of his traits have changed.

And there is an even greater tendency to judge the Biedenkopf of the moment in the light of the variety of stances he has taken in widely differing situations.

The resulting evaluation of him must make him feel like a man who has been kicked by a mule.

He is bound to feel that he has not exactly been spoiled in terms of a fair evaluation. But then, he has never been all that thin-skinned.

Johann Georg Reissmüller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 17 August 1982)

A clean breast

Continued from page 3

considered an exception. But over the past four years its debt to the West almost doubled, to $9.6bn.

In the United States, whose president promised an unprecedented economic boom in his 1980 election campaign, more than one million jobs became redundant within a year. There are now 11 million jobless, 9.8 per cent of the work force.

And the same president who wanted to boost the economy by lowering taxes has now called for tax increases to offset the more than $100bn budgetary deficit. The fact that every country in the world has the same problems shows that this can hardly be due to mistakes made by the individual governments. The roots of the trouble must lie deeper.

Glotz, Biedenkopf and Geissler have named some of these roots: the illusion that, despite the population explosion and rapidly disappearing natural resources we can still act as if there were a huge cake to be distributed; the illusion that society can provide material security for the individual in any and all situations; and, finally, the mortally dangerous thesis that such security can be guaranteed by armament for which the world spent more than $500bn last year.

The German parties alone won't be able to eliminate such ingrained ideas. But should they not at least tell the electorate that even the best party cannot succeed without a change in world politics rather than continuing to sling mud at each other?

Just telling the public where the roots of the crisis lie would be a huge step forward. And who, if not the parties, is to do this?

H. W. Kettenbach

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 16 August 1982)

Madame is the chief at the Economic Affairs Ministry

"Madame," as her own Economic Affairs Ministry staff call their boss, Birgit Breuel, is still the shining star of Lower Saxony's cabinet under Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht (CDU).

Hardly anybody still identifies her with Hamburg, her home town; and only her antagonists still cling to her previous nickname "Banker's Baby".

Yet Birgit Breuel's political career owes nothing to her father's name, the banker Alwin Münchmeyer.

Her interest in politics started at rock bottom when, as a mother living in Hamburg, she became interested in education policy as a matter of necessity.

But her economic acumen and international experience in this field prompted her to go into economic policy making.

She was a Hamburg opposition legislator when Albrecht asked her to join his cabinet four years ago.

Her first official act as Economic Affairs Minister of Lower Saxony — she succeeded Erich Küpker (FDP) — was to shake up the Ministry bureaucrats.

She then proceeded to make her fellow CDU legislators in Lower Saxony get used to tough debates on specific issues — and that included her colleague at the time, Walther Leisler Kiep, and Prime Minister Albrecht himself.

The Hamburg girl soon developed into a fighter who kicked against the traces no matter how much they tried to keep a rein on her.

Like her fellow cabinet member,



Birgit Breuel ... champions private enterprise. (Photo: dpa)

Education Minister Werner Remmers, in his field, she kept coming up with original ideas time and again and soon attracted nation-wide attention.

Minister Breuel champions private enterprise rather than state intervention to revive ailing companies; she opposes the post office monopoly and is adamantly against government subsidies and red tape.

She is equally adept at arguing with the elegance of the épée as she is at wielding a broadsword.

She has never been known to shirk a controversy nor does she try to hide the fact that she is family-oriented, as shown by the conspicuous display of the photographs of her three sons on her desk.

Birgit Breuel can at times be an annoyance to her own party — for instance when she attacks the CDU's programme by deploring the fact that she has to sin against CDU principles by granting subsidies.

This annoyance — especially to legislators who are more interested in gaining advantages for their own constituencies than in upholding principles — tends to backfire.

For instance: her fellow party members have dug in their heels and refused to grant her a safe assembly seat by putting her in a suitable place on the ticket.

But this leaves Birgit Breuel, who is now making a bid to break down the rigid front against the Greens, unperturbed.

Niels N. von Haken

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 22 August 1982)

FINANCE

Ranks of the optimists are thinning out

The longer the recession runs, the fewer the voices — both in Germany and elsewhere — predicting a quick recovery.

Fears of a long decline are spreading. Many think that things could get a great deal worse before they get better. Some can ever visualise disaster like the Great Crash.

Some of the fears are supported by the huge mountain of debt that has accumulated over the past 20 years, especially since some of the borrowers are not as safe as the lenders once thought. Poland for example.

Pessimists fear that individual major borrowers could cause cracks in the banking system and lead to its collapse.

This could further damage international trade (already being hampered by bureaucratic obstacles) and eventually make it grind to a halt.

Some banks could find themselves in considerable difficulties if they have to write off large-scale bad debts.

Such banking problems in one country or another have been mounting, and not only in the international credit business.

In Germany and the United States, there is a danger of borrowers being unable to repay loans due to the poor economic situation.

In the United States, for instance, several medium and small banks have gone bankrupt this year.

The insolvency of the Milan-based Banco Ambrosiano has in the past few weeks *affected its Luxembourg and Bahamas subsidiaries, which are heavily involved in the international credit business.*

The danger signs from international and domestic credit markets in the individual countries must be taken seriously.

But disasters like the 1929 crash in the United States that engulfed the whole world by 1931 are unlikely to recur.

The lessons learned then have led to precautionary measures.

The Great Depression was caused by chain reactions triggered by the insolvency of individual companies that eventually led to a world-wide economic collapse, complete with a breakdown of the international credit system and free trade.

In 1931, when Germany's Danatbank was unable to meet its commitments — marking the beginning of the great crisis in Europe — the government asked the other banks to launch a common rescue action.

Then, one bank manager voiced the view of the banking community as a whole when he said: "They expect us to bolster our competitor — what cheek!"

The collapse of the Cologne-based Herstatt Bank in 1974 and of America's Franklin Bank sounded the alarm. Emboldened by their booming business performance, bankers had tended to be careless in granting credit. The Herstatt collapse brought it home to them how quickly heavy losses can occur.

Ever since, the major international banks have cooperated in a bid to prevent excessive risks by spreading loans over several banks.

They keep each other informed about the credit needs of their customers and form consortiums to provide large loans.

But this did not prevent major credit to customers with too high credit ratings, particularly in the second half of the 1970s.

The main reason was the large influx of capital to international credit markets known as the Eurodollar market. This came about as a result of the current account deficits of the United States in the 1960s.

Foreign banks with dollar claims used that money in their international credit business, lending it to other parties. Apart from being a market for short-term credit, the Eurodollar market soon also developed into a Eurobond market.

The dollar claims were readily accepted and used for further credits as long as the dollar remained hard.

But when the dollar softened in the early 1970s, the Euromarket experienced a new influx of money from banks, commercial enterprises and private individuals in a wide variety of Western industrial countries.


They felt that they could move their money more easily, cheaply and profitably on the Euromarket than they could in their home countries. But above all, money on the Euromarket was not subjected to the same stringent tax regulations as at home.

In the early 1970s there was also an *influx* of money from the oil-producing countries which turned into a flood after the dramatic oil price increase in the autumn of 1973.

Towards the end of the 1970s, transfers of money from the Western industrial countries to the Eurodollar market increased still further.

In 1960, the money available for credits on the Eurodollar market was just under $1bn, rising to $70bn by 1970, according to the Bank for International Settlements.

At the end of 1978, the market stood at $893bn, exceeding one trillion dollars by the end of 1979 and rising to 1.54 trillion by the end of 1981.



No matter how they are evaluated, these figures show the enormous flood of money to the Eurodollar market and the extent the borrowing on that market has reached.

The flood was particularly strong in 1979. Of the $83bn of new lending, more than ever before went to non-oil producing developing countries and the East Bloc. Short-term credits to developing countries rose by $35.9bn and those to the Communist Bloc by $7.3bn.

In 1980, the banks became more cautious and reduced their new credits to developing and Communist countries. But the risks remained high because of the loans granted before 1980.

According to the Bank for International Settlements, credits to developing countries (excluding long-term bonds) stood at $230bn by the end of 1981 and those to Communist countries at $61bn. In addition, the Communist countries borrowed some $20bn against bonds on international money markets.

After loans to Poland became risky and individual developing countries defaulted in repayments, the banks became aware of the risks and — presumably — took the necessary precautions to ward off liquidity problems should their borrowers become insolvent.

The spreading of risk between many banks has reduced the risk to the individual lenders. Moreover, each participant assists the other in an emergency.

Some pundits see an added risk to the international credit market in the fact that (apart from the international bond market) most of the money that comes on the market is used for short-term loans of less than one year.

The borrowers use this money to finance long-term projects, hoping to renew the credits by the rollover method.

By the same token, the lending banks work on the assumption that the withdrawal of short-term deposits will be offset by new money being deposited.

It was the sudden withdrawal of short-term deposits that caused the 1931 bank crisis. The banks were unable to recall their long-term credits and so became insolvent.

Today, sudden withdrawal of short-term funds could also cause problems to individual banks but they could not paralyse the entire banking system because the close cooperation ties that now exist between banks involved in the international credit business.

The deposits that are withdrawn from one bank do not disappear into thin air but are usually deposited in another bank, which is thus put in a position to assist a bank in trouble.

The central banks would also be much more prepared to jump into the breach than they were in 1931.

But saying that there is no reason to fear a collapse of the international mountain of debt does not mean that we can afford idly to watch this mountain grow.

Already envisaged stiffer controls of the international credit market are necessary.

Heinz Pentzlin

(Die Welt, 14 August 1982)

Old cures aren't working, says World Bank

The world economy has reached a low point, according to the World Bank. Its World Development Report for 1982 says that inadequate growth is a major reason.

Economic measures industrialised countries had previously used to get their economies going, with some success, were not working this time.

"High public sector deficits, a policy of tight money and fear of inflation have led to unprecedented high interest rates. This has curbed growth and caused the export earnings of developing countries to dwindle," says the report.

This, plus the added load of debt servicing, has left many developing countries with no option but to curb their own growth as well.

The wide disparity of interest rates in the industrial countries has triggered large capital movements and caused considerable exchange rate fluctuations, says the report.

"This has introduced a new element of uncertainty into international terms of trade the early 1980s."

It criticises the fact that many industrial countries have not geared their investment towards higher growth rates despite lower oil prices.

"When governments that are prepared to make the necessary efforts are prevented from doing so through political pressure, the consequence is lower growth rates world-wide for the rest of the decade."

The report shows deep concern over the economies of developing countries. Excessive interest rates, high energy costs and low commodity prices on world markets have hit them hard — especially the African states south of the Sahara, the report says.

The international buying power of commodity earnings on which many developing countries depend is as low as it has rarely been since the end of World War II.

At the same time, the prices for industrial goods have remained almost unchanged.

As a result, the terms of trade have deteriorated still further for the developing world.

Declining commodity prices resulted in earning losses to Third World nations of between $12bn and $15bn in 1981.

The main reason for the drop in commodity prices was the reduced demand for raw materials in the industrial countries and the reduction of the processing industry's stocks due to high interest rates.

Hans-Georg Glaser

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 16 August 1982)

BUSINESS

A burned-out case: Germany's state safety-match monopoly runs out

Germany's state monopoly on matches is to run out on 15 January 1983.

The monopoly dates back to when most homes were heated with a coal stove and smokers lit their cigarettes with a match because lighters were a luxury.

The match was both an indispensable part of daily life and a major economic factor.

But the state monopoly was not due to any power drive. It was almost a last-ditch attempt by a financially crippled government to obtain a loan from a private individual.

The individual was the legendary Swedish industrialist and financier Ivar Kreuger, who had managed to buy up most of Germany's ailing match industry after the First World War.

By systematically buying up match industries throughout the world he hoped to gain a world monopoly; and there were, in fact, times when he controlled 90 per cent of the world's match production.

But this was not enough. Like some of the great merchants of the Middle Ages, he branched out to become a financier of nations.

In the late 1920s, the German government urgently needed money. Kreuger jumped into the breach, lending the government the then huge amount of $125m on condition that a state monopoly on matches be introduced. The six per cent interest rate was thought to be favourable.

The government established the *Deutsche Zündwaren-Monopolgesellschaft* (German monopoly company for matches) which, on top of the interest, paid Kreuger an initial 50 and later 25 per cent of net profits — a fine deal considering the company's monopoly.

Kreuger made money hand over fist, though moralists who say that money alone does not mean happiness were proved right three years later when he was killed by a bullet. It is still not known whether it was fired by him or someone else.

What is known is that his financial empire was shaky and that its collapse hastened the world-wide depression.

The beneficiaries of the monopoly were Kreuger's heirs, who still draw not only interest payments but also a share of the profits of the few German manufacturers who then bought monopoly company stock.

They are something of a closed club which, though having to accept prices dictated from above, has a sales guarantee for its output since the Frankfurt-based monopoly company buys their entire production for distribution.

There is thus no competition and no over-production: 80 per cent of the output consists of the two standard items known as "Haushaltsware" and "Welthölzer", the rest being special matches, usually ordered by advertising companies for their clients.

Until 1980, all these products had to be sold at fixed prices. But this was changed in anticipation of the end of the monopoly next year. Since then, a box of standard matches retails for anything between 6 and 10 pfennigs.

The peak of the post-World War II business was in 1970 when the company sold an annual 215,000 crates of 10,000 boxes each — a total of one hundred billion matches. But then business started declining steeply. Cheap throwaway lighters proved formidable competition.

By 1974, sales had dwindled to one-third of the 1970 volume, and the state's share of the profits declined accordingly. At present, this share amounts to about DM3m a year, accounted for by five factories with a total payroll of 450.

But it is not the lack of profit that has prompted the state to abolish its monopoly. The reason is that the last instalment on the $125m loan that was made in 1930 will be repaid on 15 January 1983.

This last $275,000 payment marks the end of the Federal Republic of Germany's commitment to maintain the monopoly, and there is no reason to keep this relic from another era going.

So 15 January 1983 also marks the beginning of free competition on the match market. The monopoly matches in their drab boxes will disappear.

Price differences will probably be greater, largely due to foreign competitors who are bound to crowd the German market.

Even so, German manufacturers consider their prospects good. Their intention is to rely heavily on new shapes and colours, hoping to attract individualists who consider it cheapskate to use a throwaway lighter to light an expensive cigar.

Rudolf Grosskopff

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 12 August 1982)

Door-to-door sales code

A new code of conduct has been drawn up with the aim of increasing protection for people buying from door-to-door salesmen.

Fourteen companies specialising in door-to-door sales have established a working party named *Gut beraten — zu Hause gekauft* (roughly, well advised to buy at home).

It has drafted a code for 140,000 door-to-door salesmen who account for annual sales of about DM3.5bn.

Administration is to be watched over by a control commission comprising representatives of both sellers and buyers.

The chairman of the working party, Bertelsmann director Hans Zopp, is unhappy that misconduct by some salesmen has led to prejudice against the lot.

The new code is designed to rectify this, he said.

"Being above board in our dealings is essential. We must have sound principles if we want to maintain our market position".

The control commission wants to show that self-regulation is enough. It wants to avoid legislation.

Members are Marcel Kisseler of the Centre for Combating Unfair Competition, Frankfurt (chairman); the Munich lawyer Professor Walter Löwe, who has long been a committed advocate of consumer protection; and Fritz A. Hasenmüller, manager of Avon Cosmetics.

Complainers can telephone the commission at any time. It will also deal with complaints against firms that are not members of the working party, using civil and criminal law.

An information sheet is to be published for customers. Professor Löwe deplores the fact that, unlike America and Britain, Germany lacks a strong consumer protection organisation.

So far, he says, the retailers' lobby has prevented legislation that would enable the buyer to cancel a cash deal made at his door.

The companies that are part of the working party voluntarily grant their customers the right to return a cash purchase and get all their money back within eight days.

While the retail business in general complains about tough times, firms specialising in door-to-door selling are optimistic, expecting this year's sales to rise ten per cent against 1981.

The 14 companies that are part of the working group — among them such major firms as Avon, Bertelsmann, Electrolux, Kobold and Vorwerk — expect sales to rise from DM3.1bn to DM3.5bn this year.

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 13 August 1982)

Third World handicrafts face mass-production threat

The German retail market for handicrafts from Third World countries is declining. People have less money to spend and are tending to look for cheaper mass-produced products, say Third World representatives.

There are 220 Third World shops in Germany. They get their goods from a central pool called Company for the Promotion of Partnership with the Third World (GEPA).

GEPA is formed jointly by the churches and action groups. It has the aim



of encouraging development through trade, but it has also helped promote a German trend towards buying more exotic goods.

A spokesman, Gerd Nickoleit, says that commercial companies with less altruistic motives have jumped on to the bandwagon.

The Ikea furniture company, for instance, discovered that the basketware GEPA imports from Bangladesh were popular. Ikea now gets similar goods manufactured more cheaply in Taiwan, where wages are at rock bottom.

Conditions for the "alternative Third World trade" have changed in the past couple of years due to higher costs for raw materials, transport and tools and machinery from the industrial world. In addition, there are GEPA's strict product and project criteria whereby only goods made by hand according to traditional patterns are bought by the company, says Nickoleit.

Large commercial companies, on the other hand, have such goods mass produced in countries "where the wage levels are lowest and working conditions worst." The designs are no longer traditional but their own.

This has led to a growing supply of mass-produced products that only resemble the original.

In addition the buying power of the typical buyers of Third World products has diminished.

The crisis is not yet reflected in the turnover of GEPA, which was up to DM12.4m last year (30 per cent more than the previous year); but the rise in sales is accounted for by such consumer goods as coffee, tea and honey, which are riskier and offer a smaller profit margin.

Even though GEPA is a non-profit organisation, it must nevertheless earn its operating costs of about DM3m a year. These costs include expenditures for education and information.

A possible way out of the dilemma would be to adopt the practices of commercial companies and cater to bulk buyers. Enough parties have already voiced their interest, says Nickoleit.

A major nuclear power station operator, for instance, wanted to buy large quantities of jute bags intended to bear the printed slogan "Nuclear Electricity Instead of Oil".

This was rejected in keeping with GEPA's sales criteria.

But Nickoleit has another revolutionary alternative up his sleeve for commercial dealers. He wants to attract customers by high prices: "A fair price has always been a high price." It is this slogan around which his stepped-up information campaign is to be centred.

Specific examples are to demonstrate the problems of world trade, bare injustices, name profit-mongers and discuss alternatives.

Double aim

The public must not only be made to sign resolutions on behalf of a fair world trade; it must also be convinced that "its specific buying habits can contribute towards a more equitable world trade system."

To remain credible, GEPA must also make it clear that "alternative trade" can never be a true alternative to commercial trade, seen in an overall economic context. All it can be is a "learning and action model."

The future will show whether this will summon new buyers who are prepared to open their purse strings wider.

For GEPA and Nickoleit, it will be a "tight-rope act between business and education campaign."

Roland Bunzenthal

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 August 1982)

■ FOCUS

Portrait of a nation weighed down with a lot of worries

West Germans have more worries than people in the other nine Common Market countries.

This is one of many findings of the latest Euro-Barometer, a regular report based on opinion polls in EEC member-countries.

The report, and the market research on which it is base, is commissioned by the European Commission in Brussels and polls are held in April and October.

Germans are less easily impressed by fine words about noble humanitarian goals than people in other EEC countries.

They continue to be more satisfied with their democratic system of government than anyone else in the European Community. In no other Common Market country are so many people convinced they can voice their opinions freely and without let or hindrance.

Yet they are still worried. Seventy-seven per cent are worried that environment is in jeopardy, as against an EEC average of 57 per cent.

The Greeks come next, with 69 per cent, followed by the Danes, Dutch and Luxembourgers with 65 per cent each.

Three out of four West Germans are worried about rising unemployment, (EEC as a whole: 66 per cent).

This is probably because unemployment has long been higher than in Germany in most other EEC countries.

Sixty-two per cent of Germans (EEC average of 41 per cent) are worried that living conditions are growing increasingly artificial.

Fears of a critical deterioration in international relations worries 51 per cent of Germans, as against an EEC average of 35 per cent.

The Greeks, with 53 per cent, are also higher than average, (probably because of their relationship with neighbouring Turkey) and so are the Danes (44 per cent).

Yet only 25 per cent of the Dutch, relatively keen supporters of the peace movement, said it was a possibility that worried them.

Germans were less worried than the EEC average last April about trends in crime and terrorism.

But they were extremely worried, relatively speaking, at the possibility of a lengthy interruption in supplies of oil and gas and the prospect of serious inroads into human life by medical and pharmaceutical discoveries.

People in all 10 Common Market countries were asked to take their pick of the following 10 major targets: peace, human rights, sexual equality, war on poverty, freedom of the individual; nature conservation, defence, religion, European integration and revolution.

Both in Germany and the EEC as a whole only three per cent gave pride of place to revolution as a target.

Above average interest was shown by Germans in nature conservation (39 per cent, as against 35 per cent), sexual equality (17 per cent, as against 16 per cent) and European integration (13 per cent, as against 11 per cent).

Peace was given pride of place by 67 per cent in the EEC as a whole, but by only 57 per cent in Germany. Human rights were ticked by 44 per cent in the entire Common Market, as against 38 per cent in Germany.

War on want is rated important by 40 per cent in the Ten, but by only 29 per cent of Germany, and it is the same with freedom of the individual, for which the percentages are 40 and 31.

A mere 17 per cent of Germans attach major importance to defence, as issue on which the Belgians, Dutch and Irish are even less enthusiastic.

Forty-four per cent of Greeks feel national defence matters, as do 28 per cent each in Britain, France and Luxembourg. Even the Italians, with 23 per cent, are keener than the Germans.

One reason why the Germans are less committed to human rights and individual freedom may be that 91 per cent of West Germans feel that anyone can voice criticism without needing to fear the consequences.

This is a view shared by only 83 per cent in the EEC as a whole and by 77 per cent of the French and 70 per cent of the Belgians.

Seventy-two per cent of West Germans feel everyone can pretty well do more or less what he wants; the EEC figure is 69 per cent.

On this point Germany is outstripped by Luxembourg, with 86, Britain, with 78, and Holland, with 75 per cent, which arguably might have something to do with Germany's efficient bureaucracy.

Only 66 per cent of the French feel that within reason they are at liberty to do what they want.

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 August 1982)

What the hosts think about the foreigners

A growing number of Germans fe[el] there are too many foreigners i[n] the country, according to an Allensba[ch] poll. Last summer 79 per cent said so; this summer the percentage was up [to] 82.

Only eight per cent of Germans inte[r]viewed felt there were not too many fo[r]eigners in the Federal Republic.

There were few issues on which public opinion was so largely agreed. A defensive attitude was found in all generations and political parties and at all educational and income levels.

Yet the pollsters do not feel that Germans can generally be said to be xenophobic. Only a small and isolated minority clamour for foreigners to all be sent packing, says Allensbach's Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann.

The overwhelming majority favour a solution that avoids hardship. About ... per cent of a sample of 1,107 Germans would prefer to see the 4.7 million migrant workers and asylum-applicants in Germany offered a cash settlement in return for agreeing to go back home.

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 29 July 1982)

More time in front of TV

Germans spent an average of two hours a day watching television last year. This is a slight increase over 1980.

Media researchers Wolfgang Dar[s]chin of the ARD network and Bern[h]ward Frank, of ZDF, say most of the increase was because morning programmes were introduced last year.

They write in the magazine *Media Perspektiven* that adult viewers spent an average of 122 minutes watching TV on weekdays last year. Four minutes were in the morning.

Average time in 1980 was 119 minutes, but that was all between 3 pm and ... am. In 1979 they watched 118 minutes each.

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 16 July 1982)

Germans 'lack national and professional pride'

Germans lack national pride and pride in their work, according to a market researcher.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann writes in a newspaper article that the trend could weaken the entire fabric of society.

Professor Noelle-Neumann is employed by the Federal Republic's leading market research institute, Allensbach.

She has found that latest surveys indicate that only 21 per cent of Germans are very proud of their nationality, as against 80 per cent of Americans and, in the wake of the Falklands war, 55 per cent of the British.

Only 15 per cent of Germans are equally proud of their work or career, as opposed to 84 per cent of Americans and 79 per cent of British.

Neighbouring Belgians, Danes and Dutch are not particularly proud of their jobs either, but they are prouder than the West Germans.

Eleven per cent of Germans questioned claimed not to be proud at all. Only seven per cent of Italians echoed this sentiment, three per cent of Japanese and one per cent of Americans.

In both sectors, she says, the answers given by Germans seem likely to weaken society. Similar overall conclusions are reached in respect of the Japanese, another nation defeated in the Second World War.

National pride is closely linked to defence preparedness. Only 35 per cent of Germans are ready to fight for their country, as opposed to 71 per cent of Americans and 62 per cent in Britain.

This shortfall in national ties, she suggests, could lead to the Federal Republic becoming a country in which the trend is even more markedly towards emigration rather than immigration.

Klaus-Ulrich Moeller

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 7 August 1982)

■ INDUSTRY

Era of cheap electricity coming to an end

An era of cheap electricity for German industry is coming to an end. Contracts negotiated a decade ago when it seemed that the age of cheap nuclear fuel was just around the corner are due to run out.

The problem is that nuclear power is turning out to be more expensive than first thought.

It is likely to cost more than 10 pfennigs a kilowatt by the 1990s, according to one estimate. This compares with some current contracts as low as two pfennigs per kilowatt.

Some industrial consumers want to import electricity from France, which has an excess. But this might be difficult. At least one German power company is said by one manufacturer to be "barbarously brutal" in not helping.

The power companies deny obstructing the importation of electricity.

Experts feel that by 1990 French nuclear power will cost about 7 pfennigs a kilowatt to generate and between 11 and 12 pfennigs in Germany.

French nuclear stations are being built at half the price of the German.

Rudolf Escherisch, managing director of Vereinigte Aluminium-Werke (VAW) says that unless a compromise is reached, production will eventually be ...

VAW, a company wholly owned by the Bonn government, is paying about the same as its competitors in other Western countries, he says. That is, between 3.8 and 4 pfennigs per kilowatt.

Herr Escherisch doesn't see why his company, which has so far been mainly supplied by power generated from brown coal, should be switched to the more expensive nuclear fuel.

... Grosch, board chairman of Dynamit Nobel, a chemicals subsidiary of the Flick group, says that all large-scale power consumers look like coming off ... in the long term.

He sees little hope of avoiding increases. Electricity is not really available on the free market he says, and when a potential supplier (that is, France) is found "you are waylaid by highway robbers."

The power companies association, VDEW, denies that the companies are trying to stop power from being imported. It says the monopolies regulations prevents them from doing so.

But the deputy manager of VDEW, ... Heinemann, does agree that industry has problems.

"People have good reason to be worried," he says. But he cannot see what the power companies can do. Concessional terms are banned under monopolies legislation. The Monopolies Commission, he says, insists on equal treatment for everyone.

In most cases existing agreements are due to expire by the end of the decade.

Power costs were encouragingly low a decade or so ago when the power companies felt cheap nuclear power was just around the corner and state governments were keen on industrial development.

Aluminium manufacturers and power companies soon came to terms. Charges as low as two pfennigs per kilowatt were negotiated and guaranteed for up to 20 years.

It seemed good business at the time for the electricity companies. The aluminium industry is an ideal customer, taking a steady amount of electric power 24 hours a day.

This enables power stations to run night and day, so the can afford to offer such a customer the lowest prices possible.

They were initially delighted at having gained a major new customer whose consumption enabled them to build power stations on a large scale but the smile was soon wiped off their faces.

In many cases nuclear power was not as inexpensive as had been hoped. As one power utility executive now frankly admits:

"We didn't cost operations at all. We felt sure we could do with nuclear power what RWE (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk, Germany's largest electricity company) could afford to do with power from brown coal-fired power stations."

Costs spiralled unexpectedly, whereas prices were slow to follow, with the result that thew power companies had to increase their charges to other consumers to offset losses on long-term, large-scale contracts.

Domestic consumers of electricity in, say, Hamburg pay a high price for their electric power because the local electricity board offered an aluminium and a steel works concessional rates to set up in the city.

Understandably, the electricity companies are now trying to increase industrial power prices.

Power-intensive industrial enterprises are worried how they are going to make ends meet.

VAW's Escherich says brown coal-fired power doesn't cost much more than three pfennigs a kilowatt to generate. He is happy, with this and would like to stay with brown coal.

Electricity consumers all complain that the power companies insist on charging customers prices based on the average cost of production, with rebates for bulk consumers at best.

"Are they prepared to consider special terms?" asks a chemical industry executive (chemicals is another power-intensive industry). The answer, he says, is no, not in the least.

France first tried to tempt German companies to set up facilities over the border by offering concessional rates. The French now seem prepared to sell cut-price power to consumers in Germany.

One leading chemicals company has been offered electric power at five pfennigs per kilowatt from the French border.

This is where the problems start. German electricity producers are understandably unenthusiastic about allowing this imported power through the grid.

An executive of the chemicals company in question says RWE is barbarously brutal in having not the slightest intention of ever lending a hand in importing power from France.

The French are reported now to be so intimidated that they are only prepared to negotiate terms in conjunction with an RWE representative.

The power companies will hear nothing of allegations that they are stalling on letting outside suppliers send power in.

The Monopolies Act, they say, expressly forbids them to unfairly prevent an industrial consumer from buying power by charging exorbitant fees for channelling outside power through the grid.

Agreements by which electricity companies merely relay outside power supplies do exist, Herr Heinemann says. BASF in Ludwigshafen, for instance, uses the national grid to relay power from its own power station in Marl, Westphalia.

But he also raises several objections. Can industrial consumers who buy electric power abroad really be sure their supplies are guaranteed?

Who is going to step in and bridge the gap if foreign supplies are cut?

Is there going to be enough line capacity to relay all that power? Even if there is, someone is going to have to foot the bill. Technically it can all be done; whether it is economic is another matter.

Besides, importing power from Germany's "nuclear" neighbour, France, will clearly solve only a few problems for a limited number of consumers and over a limited period.

Electricité de France may have a current power surplus as a result of developing nuclear power so rapidly, but it is by no means enough to meet the requirements of many power-intensive industrial consumers in Germany for any length of time.

Chemicals, steel and non-ferrous metals use about 80bn kilowatts a year, which calls for at least 12,000 megawatts of installed capacity, including reserve capacity.

Buying electric power in France does not look a long-term prospect either. There is growing criticism of nuclear power station construction in France, and little enthusiasm can be expected for building nuclear power stations in France to meet power requirements in Germany.

A full-scale solution can only be reached by agreement between power-intensive industrial consumers and the power companies themselves.

But as long as new nuclear power stations are likely to cost about DM5bn, including interest payments on capital investment, there can be little likelihood of an acceptable kilowatt price.

The French built their nuclear power stations for less than half this price, so they have a tremendous advantage.

Stations in Germany would only be cheaper if planning procedures were faster and safety standards lower.

KWU, the power station manufacturers, have a virtual monopoly but cannot be expected to be able to cut prices until more orders come in.

Industrial consumers lay part of the blame at the door of local and regional politicians who have the final say on price increases for household consumers.

Politicians have often stalled on price increases, with the result that electricity companies have had to charge industry more.

Industry would sooner see the boot on the other foot, as Hanns Arnt Vogels of the Flick group noted at the last general meeting of the Association of Industrial Power Consumers.

"In the interest of the German economy as a whole," he said, "we demand power prices based on cost orientation as opposed to a mistaken egalitarianism."


Power-intensive industrial consumers suspect that RWE, the electricity company they all love to hate, is keen on the egalitarian approach for reasons of its own.

They feel it hopes to exert pressure on politicians by leaning heavily on industry, thereby persuading the politicians to give it the go-ahead to build more nuclear power stations.

Heinz Günter Kemmer

(Die Zeit, 6 August 1982)

(Photo: Sven Simon)



TELEVISION

Why 15 million people float high on the foam bubbles of Dallas

Frankfurter Rundschau

...a quarter to ten on Tuesday evenings between 13 and 15 million ...man viewers are glued to their TV ...to see the latest episode of *Dallas.*

The serialised saga of quarrels and ...gue in the Ewing family, a clan of ...as oil billionaires, is probably the ...successful TV programme in the ...at present.

...is a soapbox opera in every sense ...term: lots of foam and very little ...for it.

...there is no point in going to town ...the banality of the dialogue, the lack ...imagination in the production, the ...matic character of the dramatic ...uction and the inability of the ...to act naturally rather than pull fa-

...is more interesting to consider why ...rial of this kind is able to prompt ...a powerful response and why it ...ers reactions verging on hysteria.

Texas is made out to be a big, beauti- ...and rich country, with the emphasis ...oil. There are drilling rigs and pipe- ...everywhere.

Pumping out wealth

...aming, gigantic, concrete and ...Dallas skyscrapers responsible ...ke sure that the wealth does not ...continues to earn good mo-

...are the oil millionaires, and ...are plenty of them in that part of ...world. They wear stetsons and cow- ...to their tailor-made suits, or ...legend has it.

...they richly deserve the fortune ...earn, and it would take an envious ...to begrudge them it.

...principle they live lives much the ...those of ordinary folks. They ...trouble with the kids, with their ...money (although on a larger ...you or I).

...ointments are interspersed ...pected pleasures and constant ...as morning coffee on the ...or evening meal for the entire ...in his or her allotted place.

...daily routine is what gives them ...of security and something to ...over the years; it is reassur- ...ing.

...ings are anything but an ideal ...however, and that is what makes ...successful.

...fight out on a large scale the ...of families everywhere, but ...factor is that intrigue is ...far enough to endanger the ...unit.

...s are clearly cast. J. R. is the ...Bobby the goodie. Then there ...beautiful, long suffering women ...family.

...there is the evil that comes ...side the immediate family cir- ...a competitor, a busi- ...who does not play fair, ...love affair.

...k, the grand old man, lords it ...all. His sons, even J. R., re- ...call him 'Sir' and no-one would even dare to challenge his commanding position in the family.

This finely balanced combination of an intact family and a permanent state of war is probably what has made the series so successful.

Who doesn't have a black sheep in the family, not one capable of competing with J. R., perhaps, but a black sheep all the same?

Who has never had trouble with love *affairs* of one kind or another, albeit not to the extent that seems to prevail in the Ewing family?

Who would not like to have a father like Jock Ewing, or perhaps to be one like him? There can be no reservations on this point. Jock is a fine and faultless father. His heart attack merely makes him appear even more human.

Surprisingly little actually happens in the course of a *Dallas* episode. It is mostly talk, interspersed with stndard shots of the Ewing ranch, the swimming pool and the Ewing skyscraper block.

What does happen is evenly divided into plot units that reach a climax culminating, in America, in the advertising slot.

What happens in three quarters of an hour of *Dallas* would take a mere 15 minutes to tell in a more tightly packed episode of slightly more urgent drama.

This is less surprising. An American TV series, especially this one, has three hallmarks: it is extended, it lasts and it confirms what one has come to expect.

Surprise is usually what accounts for much of a film's pleasure from the viewer's point of view. You go to the cinema to see something out of the ordinary, special and fantastic.

Dallas is just the opposite. You watch an episode because you know what it is all about. You know the people who take part in it and merely want to see how they cope with whatever happens to them next. It's a pretty feeble excuse, but the series is habit-forming and it takes effort to stop something one has grown accustomed to doing. There is a certain kind of TV series that grows more popular the longer it lats. *Bonanza, Spaceship Enterprise, Der Kommissar* and *Der Alte* are cases in point. Once they have gained a firm place in viewers' affections they are loved, a part of life you wouldn't want to miss. They become items of personal furniture, as it were.

One of life's stage properties does not take kindly to being pushed around or given a new look every now and then. The result is a vicious circle.

By virtue of the permanent reproduction of the same standards of content and aesthetics you come to expect what you have grown accustomed to and to object to any departure from the rule.

So a TV series has a rhythm of its own and cannot be compared with a motion picture. There is no intention of working up to a climax. Indeed, a climax would be a grave mistake, as it is always a conclusion too.

Regular routine is what counts. It is always much the same at exactly the same time, a quarter to ten every Tuesday. It is a cyclical recurrence of something always identical.

This being so, developments are not required. The Ewings will never change; there will never be a big bang that changes everything.

It will all carry on as it already has for five yers in America. Pamela may have an affair. Lucy may have a baby. But J. R. can be sure to continue trying all the tricks in the book in his quest for power and his bids to outsmart Bobby.

Ray may settle down, or maybe he won't. Sooner or later Jock seems sure to have another heart attack. The more things change, the more they stay the same.


We seem set to grow old with the Ewings. Let us hope they die before we do!

Gunar Hochheiden

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 August 1982)

DIENSTAG, 21.45 UHR: DALLAS-FIEBER

How the weekly news magazine, Stern, sees the baddie, J. R. Ewing, played by Larry Hagman.



The people who choose what the viewers will see

Foreign crime serials and thrillers, classic motion pictures, star-studded shows and the latest films from all over the world, some screened in Germany for the first time, are among the most attractive programmes on TV. Who chooses them?

On ARD, or Channel 1 of West German TV, this has since 1960 been the responsibility of a five-man film desk in Frankfurt. It makes the selection for nationwide viewing times; local coverage is the responsibility of regional broadcasting corporations.

Apart from *ARD-aktuell*, the current affairs desk, it is the only nationwide desk run by ARD, which pools the resources of a dozen regional corporations.

The Frankfurt panel spend much of their time touring national and international film festivals, be it Cannes or Oberhausen. They visit programme fairs and check the annual output of film and TV on offer.

About 600 motion pictures a year are available, but only 160 to 170 can be selected and screen rights bought for transmission on Channel 1.

The financial, contractual and commercial business of licence procurement is handled by Degeto-Film GmbH, an ARD subisidiary based in the same Frankfurt building as the film desk.

The range of canned TV material on offer is enormous and almost impossible to survey easily.

Over 18,000 film and TV items from all over the world are on offer at the Cannes TV programme fair, followed by the latest motion pictures at the better-known film festivals.

The Frankfurt panel usually has to take in films by the dozen, so bulky are the packages offered for sale by dealers and distributors.

Spot decisions cannot be taken all the time, so cassettes are often taken back to Frankfurt for a rethink.

Most canned TV material is produced in the United States, with Hollywood still heading the bill. Over half the ARD programmes bought abroad come from America.

On day-to-day matters the Frankfurt desk maintains constant contact with Helmut Oeller, director of TV at Bayerischer Rundfunk in Munich, ... in addition to his normal job as motion picture coordinator for the German TV programme conference in Munich.

But at festivals the Frankfurt team enjoy wide-ranging powers that enable them to reach a snap decision and come to terms. They are accompanied by a Degeto team who immediately handle the contractual mechanics.

In late summer the film programme for the following year is drawn up, based on what is in stock and films newly acquired. Details are released in December in brochure form.

Foreign-language soundtracks must then be dubbed. Contracts are awarded to private companies but the Frankfurt

Continued on page 15

■ EDUCATION

Guidelines laid for new approach to social and career development

The risk of a generation of young people growing up and finding no work is a burden that weighs heavily on the industrialised societies of Western Europe.

Four years ago a series of conferences was launched by the Council for Cultural Cooperation.

The 21 member-countries of the Council of Europe are represented, also Finland and the Vatican.

Preparing for Life was the theme of the conferences, which dealt with school education. High-ranking Education Ministry officials and leading educationalists have been associated with the project.

They have been joined in working parties and seminars by representatives of Yugoslavia, the United States and Canada and have spent years investigating various aspects of the subject.

In a final declaration approved in Strasbourg they have now issued a series of recommendations to their respective governments.

In general terms they call for education systems to teach the most important knowledge, skills and attitudes in key sectors such as life in a democratic society, personal life, the world of work and cultural life.

Because these sectors are so closely linked there must be close cooperation between school and other social institutions such as the family, the community, political parties and lobbies, the world of work, the arts and corresponding groups abroad.

Schoolchildren must be given an opportunity of sharing responsibility for their education (and their future) and taking an active part in school social life.

Teachers and others associated with responsibility in education ought to be given support, such as continual in-service training, courses in educational counselling and more frequent contact with the world of work.

On leaving school young people ought to be assured of either a job or an apprenticeship or a place at an institute of further education.

These recommendations reflect the basic brief of the Council for Cultural Cooperation's Preparing for Life project, which was to work out how school could help young people.

It should help them "to play a responsible and active part in society and at work and help them to gain ability and knowledge designed to improve their prospects in the labour market and adapt to continually changing circumstances of life."

The findings were based on a number of surveys summarised for the final session in the Blackledge Report by the British head of the Centre for European Education.

Surveys did not concentrate on estimates of future labour market requirements and careers with promising prospects; the emphasis was on the student as an individual who at some stage must be left to his or her own devices and had to cope by him- or herself.

The experts geared preparations to this point of personal take-off by the individual student, bearing in mind that school was only part of the environment in which learning is acquired.

We also learn behaviour, outlook, attitudes as parents, as consumers and as citizens.

Given the speed of technological and social change in Western European societies, unemployment seems likely to remain high, the experts feel, unless something is done.

New approaches are particularly important in dealing with young people who have few qualifications, are not motivated and are hostile toward school.

Despite differences between educational systems in member-countries of the Council of Europe the experts feel a number of fundamental considerations are generally valid as part of a rethink.

The first essential is a matter of school organisation. There will always be a hierarchy at school, but school works best when as many people as possible are able to express views and share in decision-making.

This, the council said, was a line along which education authorities should be thinking. Regulated participation could prove useful in a variety of ways.

It could both take into account the changing requirements of society and give the student an opportunity of gaining valuable experience in working alongside older people and learning how social organisations worked and were run.

The second essential related to the curriculum. The experts felt a formal curriculum was not enough. The behaviour of students and staff, of school administrations and counsellors were also important.

More attention must be paid to these factors in the programmes schools offered, immediately, the school curriculum should strike a better balance between factual knowledge, understanding connections and being able to develop them.

The third essential, and most important, was a matter of staff skills. All teachers ought to have knowledge and experience of life outside school and all ought to be aware of the need to educate young people to live alongside others in society.

Education, it was noted, did not just take place at school. Home environment, friends and the mass media wield a powerful influence on a child's education.

The experts called for closer links between school education and social life so that students could gain experience in a wider context.

They should be enabled to develop to the full their individual personalities even in swiftly changing circumstances of life and thereby to improve their prospects in the working world.

Bielefeld educationalist Hartmut von Hentig was entrusted by the project group with an outline of practical educational considerations in response to the Blackledge Report.

He too noted the pace of change in industrial society and suspected that more exact definitions and detailed planning in education might well not be advisable.

As we did not know that industrial society would look like when today's young people were adults the best form of school education seemed to be one that taught basic knowledge, basic experience and basic skills, leaving the rest to other social institutions.

He recommended a four-stage system beginning with an elementary school to teach all 5- to 12-year-olds the basics. It must be near their homes and be clearly a school in character.

Thirteen- to 16-year-olds would spend the next four years jointly benefiting from as wide a range of experiences and opportunities as possible.

But they would not be required to decide in favour of specific subjects or a specific course of study and they would not be subjected to strict school regimentation.

Seventeen- to 18-year-olds (or 17- to 20-year-olds) would then be given a general vocational training, partly at school and partly outside school, but at all events well away from home.

The final stage could be specialised training for specific job skills or a specific career, partly in seminar from at university.

School, Professor von Hentig noted, could bring about changes in outlook and make the advantage of a target or an experience comprehensible.

But educational reforms we[re no] substitute for political and econo[mic re]forms that might be necessary.

A serious drawback of the ex[isting] system was that children were taught at school by staff with civ[il ser]vice status and the job security [that] went with it.

Teachers thus did not face the nor[mal] risks of adult life for which they [were] supposed to prepare their pupils, [and] they were still themselves taught by [uni]versity dons who knew precious [little] about school life.

Hentig's points and the finding[s of] the Blackledge Report, which by [no] means contradicted each other, [left] their mark on the Strasbourg confe[ren]ce's conclusions.

The experts felt Preparing for [Life] ought first and foremost to mean [deve]lopment of personality in a democ[ratic] society.

Young people could thus be en[couraged] and motivated to deliberately reach [de]cisions of their own on their future [and] not to be left helplessly to the far[...] tender mercies of swift technolog[ical] and social change.

The experts called on member-co[un]tries of the Council of Europe to t[ake] measures to ensure they were able [to do] so.

Detlef P[...]

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 August [1982])

Help for gifted children

Twenty-five German advert[ising] agencies, members of a Ham[burg-]based professional body, are to sup[port] the work of an association set up [to] help gifted children.

Promising youngsters with spo[rting] talent, fort example, are encour[aged], the group says, but not gifted childr[en].

The objectives of the German Soc[iety] for the Gifted Child must be give[n] greater publicity to ensure that pa[rents] of gifted children were helped.

Special schools and training facil[ities] ought to be set up, as in other countr[ies], to help the elite of the future.

Identification and care of gifted c[hil]dren was largely neglected in the t[rain]ing provided in the Federal Rep[ublic] for educationalists and psychologis[ts].

Yet other countries in both East [and] West had long realised that it was [irre]sponsible to neglect talent.

It was not a matter of encoura[ging] privilege or of breeding elites but of [giv]ing assistance aimed at strengthe[ning] the personalities of gifted children [so] that they could be integrated in soc[iety] as mentally stable individuals.

An industrialised country could [not] afford to allow tomorro[w's] "geniuses" to be neglected because [they] were not spotted early enough.

There had been cases of gifted c[hil]dren being given medical treatment [on] the assumption that they were suffe[ring] from nervous complaints.

It was accepted as a matter of co[urse] that special attention was paid to e[du]cationally sub-normal and handicap[ped] children.

What should be done with childr[en at] the other end of the talent scale, [the] specialy intelligent and gifted? As [mat]ters stood, they were only given any assistance after leaving school.

But gifted children showed signs [of] their promise during early childho[od] and the sooner they were identified [and] helped, the better.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Ze[itung] für Deutschland, 14 August [1982])

■ HEALTH

An alternative path to getting better

Munich's *Gesundheitspark*, or health park, has been run as an alternative health centre at the 1972 Olympic Stadium for nearly 10 years.

It was the brainchild of psychotherapist and social worker Rainer Haun, 50, who still coordinates its educational activities.

Haun is critical of the conventional medical system. All it has to offer that cannot be achieved by nature and the individual himself is, he says, a minimum of emergency treatment and protection from infant mortality and epidemics.

Everything else might occasionally ease pain or achieve a placebo effect (such are the powers of auto-suggestion) but was neither essential for health nor crucial in bringing about a cure.

He bases this claim on studies by scientists and doctors and on personal experience as an adult polio victim. In 1960 he and other polio patients were regularly told by the nurse: "Unless you do as you are told you will die."

Medical treatment, he discovered, was based on strict discipline and regimentation. He was soon to help found the Humanist Union in Munich and in 1973 he set up the centre.

It is run as a centre for physical and mental health care attached to Munich *Volkshochschule*, or adult education system, and enjoys a worldwide reputation as an experiment in alternative medicine.


At the park and in his latest book *Der befreite Patient* (The Liberated Patient) Haun offers an alternative to what he calls the consumer approach of conventional medicine.

Instead of blindly handing himself over to biocrats who pursue illness like the police follow up a crime, he writes, man must learn to reactivate and effectively use his natural powers of survival and cure.

Personal crises can be like an inoculation in life, he says. Crises that are dealt with personally have a long-term effect.

This is more than can be said for the efficacy of our luxurious system of treatment for the sick, with its repair places."

The conventional system deprives the patient of any clear responsibility for helping to solve his problems personally.



Getting better at the health park. (Photo: Herlinde Koelbl)

The patient's assessment of his personal role in health care is systematically reduced to the view that something is wrong with his body and he is in need of repair.

"We experts in medicine have just what you need," he is told. "We, not you yourself, hold the key to your problems."

An overdose of therapy can be habit-forming, like drug consumption, and millions of people have come to rely on it, Haun says, at the expense of their powers of self-healing.

He drew up the idea of the centre in 1969. It is housed in the many windowless rooms in the stands of the Olympic Stadium.

He saw it as a place where you could deliberately relax and systematically recuperate, retrieving atrophied emotional and sensual powers and improving social relationships.

His idea had little to do with conventional leisure activities or keep-fit programmes, which recent American surveys have found to be anything but a success at boosting life expectancy.

The Health Park, say psychologists who have followed its progress, has emerged as an aid centre for crisis care that is gratefully used.

The overwhelming majority of up to 700 users a day first visited the centre at a time when they were undergoing changes in life or in a condition in which they felt neither healthy nor sick.

Increasing use has come to be made of therapy offered in courses open only to those who have booked them in advance, with the result that greater emphasis is now placed on the leisure and prevention side of activities.

Befreizeit im Gesundheitspark is the slogan used. It is a play on words. *Freizeit* means spare time, or leisure; *befreien* is the verb to liberate.

Afternoon and evening programmes include autogenic training for difficulty in learning and at work, Zen meditation, a rock and roll course and group discussions on sex and love.

They range from a coronary group for patients recovering from a heart attack to perception training with the aid of a video camera.

At half past eight on a Wednesday evening, for instance, you can choose (and alternate) between four open courses: movement and encounter games to music, how to cope with emotions, a conversation group for women and health cooking (macrobiotics and herbs).

Or you can simply sweat it out in the sauna bath.

Medical care is provided as a game, so to speak, with no obligation to meet deadlines or requirements. The centre has a staff of 141, including doctors such as Professor Max Halhuber, the heart specialist, and Dr Yu Ho-fang, a Chinese medical specialist.

Rainer Haun refers in his book to his scores of specially trained medics, psychologists, adult education specialists, art and play teachers, physiotherapists and social workers as health helpers.

He draws a clear distinction between health helpers and those who merely treat the sick.

Munich's centre for crisis care is currently in the throes of a crisis itself. For years the municipal subsidy has marked time at DM650,000 per annum, which is no longer enough to cover the costs.

Yet the centre is largely self-supporting. There is not another adult education facility in Germany that can claim to cover 60 to 70 per cent of costs.

This is partly because health insurance schemes often pay course fees. About 1,000 Munich doctors regularly prescribe centre facilities.

"We are very disappointed that the city has left us in the lurch," Haun says. It has chosen to ignore an undertaking to pay in full the rent and staff wages bill.

The only solution would seem to be a steep increase in prices. The initial entry fee was DM3.50 per evening. It has risen to DM7.50, or DM6 if you buy a book of tickets.

This is what it currently costs a liberated patient to pass the time of day in the bowels of Munich's Olympic Stadium from 17 to 22.30 hours.

You can then attend courses either inside the stadium or outdoors or simply relax at the coffee shop, chatting with people over a glass of mint tea.

Karl Stankiewitz

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 14 August 1982)

Household remedy for those who can't get to sleep

Take 20 grams each of valerian root, balm-mint, hops and lavender and [..] grams of cinnamon, add to three li[tre]s of red wine and leave the mixture [to] stand for two days.

Bottle the mixture, pouring it so as to [dis]pose of the sediment, and drink a [...] glass at bedtime. You can be sure [of] pleasant dreams.

This is a recipe taken from Kurt Weidner, a specialist in internal medicine, who ran an in-service course on the meaningful use of household remedies for the Federal Medical Council in Davos, in Switzerland.

It is a nightcap, he claims, that has no psychogenic effects; in other words, it is not suggestive. It really does the trick.

Many household remedies do. Dr Weidner, who lives near Munich and has been a doctor for over 57 years, has

Continued on page 14

An entertaining diversion for cancer patients

A cancer clinic in Bavaria entertains its patients by holding regular talk shows with public figures.

The shows are run by a medical journalist, Georg Schreiber. Among his guests have been Loki Schmidt, Chancellor Schmidt's wife; Marianne Strauss, wife of Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss; actor Gustl Bayrhammer; and violinist Helmut Zacharias.

Patients at the clinic, at Oberaudorf, near Kufstein, on the Austrian border, are all women. They are being treated for cancer of the womb or breast.

The show has become something of an institution and to celebrate the 100th, after six years, a special gala show was held not in the dining hall of the clinic, but in the town's *Kursaal*.

Over the years, stars of stage, screen and TV have appeared. So have musicians, writers and others, a total of 380. The 100th show featured 40 of them, including stage and screen personalities Gert Fröbe, Bibi Johns and Elmar Gunsch.

The profits from the evening went to the Cancer Research Fund.

Schreiber is a high-powered interviewer and interrogates his guests in depth, but the emphasis is on entertainment.

Lack of humour, he says, is a serious environmental hazard, whereas health, especially the infectious variety, should be given every encouragement.

Patients are exhaustive talkers too, when they come to the clinic.

"To start with," they explain, "everyone wants to tell her own story and gain consolation." They usually spend 48 days at the clinic for chemical and hormone therapy.

There seem to be special problems that can only be discussed with other women who have suffered from cancer.

"When I see women here who have been at Oberaudorf three or four times before," one woman says, "I feel the fight against cancer is one I can win too."

The patients all readily answer questions but have one request they would like to be relayed to readers:

"Please tell people that cancer is not infectious. Why are people worried even here when a group of us go to a cafe or a shop?"

Breast cancer is a particularly serious problem for women. In the media an attractive pair of breasts is used as an advertising eye-catcher for just about everything except drinking chocolate for kiddies.

This emphasis makes it difficult for women to come to terms with breast cancer surgery, although doctors claim that it can make a good marriage even stronger.

"It's true," one woman says, "My husband really understands me better now." But if a marriage is already on the rocks breast cancer can easily lead to a total breakdown.

At Oberaudorf patients are not taught how to avoid their destiny but how to come to terms with it, and that includes learning how to accept it as an illness like any other.

dpa

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 9 August 1982)

■ MODERN LIVING

Where the workers vote the bosses in or out



The house journal of a Hamburg firm regularly runs pen portraits of people to be promoted.

The reason is not social: it is part of scheme in which staff have the opportunity to say who should run the company.

Hauni manufactures machinery for the cigarette and tobacco industry in Bergedorf, a Hamburg suburb. Its scheme is the only one of its kind in the country.

Management makes the appointments, but they are not confirmed until after a trial period. Then the candidates must be approved by their immediate staff.

This form of shopfloor influence on the company hierarchy is known at Hauni as graduated selection.

The man who first thought of it is a man of many ideas, an engineer with more than 190 patents to his name. But none of the ideas put into effect by industrialist Kurt A. Körber has such an immediate effect on company affairs as graduated selection.

It applies to all jobs below the executive suite and extends down to the smallest company unit.

Only 20 per cent of bosses of any kind at Hauni have not gone through this selection procedure, and they are the ones who have held down their present jobs since before graduated selection was introduced in 1969.

Board chairman Heinz Gretz is convinced that no-one wants to dispense with the scheme. Hauni have a payroll of 3,400, mostly skilled workers.

Over the years 300 management and supervisory jobs have been put to the vote by staff; only 12 were rejected after three to six months' probation.

Turnout is high, says Herr Gretz: "Those whom are there always vote, while those who aren't almost always use their postal votes." Voting groups vary from five to 15.

Herr Körber, who is a personal friend of Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's is responsible for a wide range of social and cultural activities.

They include the *Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, which is a kind of think tank, two centres for senior citizens and a German history competition for schoolchildren.

His staff promotion scheme must be seen as part of an entrepreneurial outlook based on the assumption that there is an inseparable link between:

- continual improvements in production by boosting technological levels
- and boosting the qualifications and motivation of the staff.

Herr Körber, 72, sees his staff as not just workers or efficient managers but as people with a comprehensive interest in developing their abilities to the full at work.

A research team from the Free University of Berlin led by Professor Theo Pirker has interviewed 400 members of Hauni staff.



Kurt A. Körber . . . progressive outlook.
(Photo: Interpress)

They listed the following reasons why, in their view, graduated selection had advantages:

- The works council, because it is involved in graduated selection, is better informed about what went on in individual departments.
- Graduated selection is a contribution toward democratisation of society.
- A boss given a resounding vote of confidence by his staff stood a better chance of getting his own way with management.
- The election of management and supervisory staff occasionally bring to light concealed conflicts within a company unit.

Two drawbacks were mentioned. They were:

- When election time draws near the boss tended to become particularly friendly.
- The trial period is a serious strain on the nerves of the candidate.

But the management, Herr Gretz says, views the selection procedure as ideal. Managerial staffs were reassured by the vote of confidence, and this benefited the company.

The voters are groups of from 5 to 15 people. The higher the position, the smaller the electorate as a rule. Only a handful of heads of department are entitled to vote on the senior man among them.

The smaller the number of voters, the more important the view of the works council chairman and vice-chairman, who always have a vote.

Herbert Schütte
(Die Welt, 12 August 1982)

Forced to take a pension he doesn't want

Alfred Schweden, 56, from Neuss, near Cologne, has drawn a pension for 25 years — but he doesn't want it.

He was dismissed from the police force at 31 on grounds of obesity and high blood pressure and paid an initial *pension of DM199 per month.*

It has since increased to DM1,650 per month and is a source of embarrassment to him. Others would be over the moon at the idea, but he is far from happy about his silver jubilee.

When he left the police force he immediately found a good job in the private sector at double his former salary. So he didn't feel entitled to a pension in a welfare state where, as he puts it, there are so many poor people.

But when he tried to refuse it, the Düsseldorf branch of the civil service pension scheme promptly objected. By the terms of the Civil Service Pensions Act he was under obligation to accept his pension, he was told.

dpa
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 31 July 1982)

A tipple or two just to get through the day

Nearly three million West Germans drink as they work, according to a Bonn government survey.

Two thousand people were questioned in 1980 by the Federal Health Education Centre, Cologne, for the Bonn Health Ministry.

Eleven per cent said alcohol was drunk daily where they worked. Stress at work was frequently offset by alcohol.

The link was most clearly apparent when jobs were taken into account. Only four per cent of workers who were not under any great strain said they always had alcohol at the ready.

But 23 per cent of workers under serious strain, or more than a million, keep a bottle within reach.

Seventeen per cent of them regularly drink more than 280 grams of pure alcohol per week, whereas the figure for the population as a whole is eight per cent.

This is the equivalent of seven litres of beer or three to four litres of wine. The survey said this group tended to serious abuse of alcohol.

It is also true that people who work hard and long smoke and take more pills and tablets than others. One in four smokes more than 15 cigarettes a day, as against 14 per cent for the population as a whole.

In stress situations recourse to medicines is a typically female response, the report notes. Sixty-three per cent of hard-working women questioned said they had taken pain-killers in the previous three months to offset symptoms of sickness.

These are people who cannot just switch off the pace and the feeling that time is short when they clock off work. The strain extends to their private lives too.

One in four said they were worried by luck of harmony in the family, as against 14 per cent for the population as a whole, and 24 per cent, as against 12 per cent, said their sex lives were not altogether satisfactory.

So it is hardly surprising that a large number felt worried the family might break up. The percentages here were … and 16.

Once tension mounts it seems to affect all aspects of life. Heavy workers have a wide range of problems, unlike people in less physically demanding jobs.

They are worried they might no longer be able to hold down their jobs. They have health problems. They are in financial difficulties. They feel worried about the future.

Once private and career difficulties are combined, people tend to smoke and drink even harder. One factor only need not lead to abuse of alcohol or nicotine as a way out.

But a combination of factors makes this wrong approach to problem solving more then likely.

Many of the people concerned are well aware that they are seeking consolation in the wrong quarter but feel incapable of doing much about it.

Indeed, smoking may begin as an occasional relaxation and quickly becomes a habit that is often felt to be an additional strain.

ddp
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 August 1982)

Continued from page 13

no axe to grind; he is not interested in alternative medicine.

"His nightcap is in strict accordance with the canon of school medicine, and he would be the first to insist that genuine organic complaints be treated by the proper specialists.

But he feels it is up to the medical practitioner to decide where the ready-made products of the pharmaceutical industry are suitable and where nature cures are called for.

Many complaints need neither a doctor nor a pharmacy. About half are cured without, or arguably despite, medical assistance.

Only six per cent of patients who visit a general practitioner's surgery really need special therapeutic treatment, he says. Household remedies, which are often handed down in families or in a specific area, are important for two reasons, Dr Weldner feels.

Household sleeping remedy

First, they enable the patients to take a more active part in their treatment, which is not normally the case. Surveys have shown that even in hospital, where patients are under surveillance, only one in three at most regularly take the drugs prescribed.

Second, household remedies tried and trusted over the centuries usually have no harmful side-effects, and they are both readily available and inexpensive.

If you can't be bothered gathering the herbs yourself you can still buy them for next to nothing in virtually any pharmacy.

There is no end to the number of remedies and the uses to which water, heat and compresses can be put.

Dr Weldner includes among his household remedies not only means of restoring health but also of promoting well-being. When, for instance, ought a sick child be put to bed?

The answer, he says, is only when it wants to, and it ought not to be left on its own. Its mother, or the family, must be handy.

Pleace and quiet can be helpful, but not absolute silence. The sick, especially sick children, ought always to retain access to the noises of their accustomed environment.

The chronically sick, he says, should read or write: letters, diaries, memoirs. Goethe said writing was one of the best medicines he knew, and he lived to be over 80!

Klaus Dallibor
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 August 1982)

■ SPORT

Bernhard Langer on the way to fulfilling a driving ambition

…nhard Langer once made everybody …p and take notice when, during a golf …rnament in Britain, he climbed a tree …get at his ball and hit it out. He also …s winning golf. He has won the German Open for two years running, the Bob … Classic, and last year was runner-up in the British Open, one of world …'s Grand Slam events. He has helped … the game on the map in Germany. So … so that a German television channel over-ran transmission time to telecast the play-off in this year's German Open between Langer and Britain's Bill Longmuir. In last year's Open, as Langer was leading the field in one of the early rounds, at least one German channel was able to muster only a black-and-white still … to use with a news bulletin. This report by Monika Zimmermann, of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Bernhard Langer's world is a course usually about six kilometres long and interspersed with 18 holes. Let others debate the philosophical repercussions; his aim is to pot his ball in as few strokes as possible.

It is a world that is easy to take in at a glance but that doesn't mean there are no ups and downs, although in his case it has been only ups.

He progresses from one pinnacle to another without making a single descent. He set out to become Germany's No. 1 golf pro and is now the No. 1 in Europe.

All that is left is for him to become the world's best. But he still has a long way to go.

Langer is modest. He may be keen to be the best, but never the greatest.

Langer knew at 12 just what he wanted to become, and at 15 he set about becoming it, so he hasn't had much time for daydreaming.

He was not an infant prodigy but took the German championship title at … as the first tangible result of his talent and determination.

He did exactly what all parents tell their children not to do and concentrated on his hobby instead of learning a trade. So instead of becoming a bricklayer like his father he went in for sport.

Sport is all he ever learnt, but he made a thorough job of learning it: from caddie to champ. He did so with such singlemindedness that he overshot even his own ambitious mark.

He is now 24 and Germany's only playing pro, the only golfer in Germany who earns his living entirely on the tournament circuit.

It is no cake-walk. He arrives on Monday, trains on Tuesday, plays in the tournament from Wednesday to Sunday, week after week, at different places and by no means always where the sun shines brightly.

For years he has spent most of his time in Britain, and although he learnt not a word of English at school he is now fluent.

He doesn't go out much with friends, although one particular blonde has been seen a lot on the greens and fairways where he plays lately.

He has played golf in America, where the big money is, and in Japan, where it is played under floodlights and on several storeys, and everywhere else.

He travels to where the game is, and not to where inclination might take him. Life consists of travelling from his hotel room to his place of work; it is easily packed into a couple of suitcases.

Now he is successful he can afford to stay at better hotels, which is a definite improvement in his life as a professional sportsman, or so he feels.

He was an amateur only as a child, later relying on a generous sponsor, and now he is in a position to earn his own living and employ both a caddy and a manager.

He is happy to consider any advice either has to make, but in the final analysis makes his own decisions. It saves him from pointing an accusing finger at either himself or others, he says.

He is a cautious, level-headed, impressively serious yet friendly man. With his blond curls he is also an eye-catcher and virtually bound to be idolised.

If he played soccer or was a racing driver he could be sure already to have qualified as an idol in Germany. But Langer is a golfer, and golf is virtually unknown in Germany.

Even the national championships go more or less unnoticed. So he had to bide his time and really step up his success to a spectacular degree to make sure he could no longer be overlooked.

He finally hit German headlines last year when he had a brilliant season in Britain. German national pride is sluggish these days and only rises to the occasion in a sporting context. Langer supplied one. Interest is now shown in him even back home in Bavaria where he still spends two or three weeks a year. But it doesn't worry him much one way or the other. He was just as unperturbed by the lack of public interest shown in his early days when he was more than once on the point of calling it a day and becoming a teaching pro. This is a way of earning a living that is always a safe option for good golf players. But at the German Open last summer in Hamburg and this summer in Stuttgart the crowds lined a golf course to see him: the first crowds of their size ever at a golf tournament in Germany. Not knowing too much about the game, they tend to wander all over the course and be something of a nuisance, but Langer impassively works his way round.

He is not unimpressed. "My wins here at home are great," he says, "but second place in England was much more important." And what goes for him goes for German golf too. (Langer was second in the British Open, one of the major world events, last year. — Ed). It took Bernhard Langer to give golf any sort of a boost in Germany. Whether it will be a permanent one may well depend on how long he is successful.

This is a responsibility he gladly accepts, realising that he will not be able to earn a living from golf in Germany until the sport has more widespread support.

As yet, however, he is the exception that proves the rule. People are usually surprised that he, as an artisan's son, ever made it to the course.

Golf in Germany is held in high repute as being exclusive. He may well earn it sporting repute by the supreme ease of his style of play.

He takes his golf seriously, with the result that it looks like child's play. Effortlessly, seemingly without straining a muscle, he drives the ball further down the fairway than others who can be seen to put every ounce of effort into their strokes.

Even his keenest rivals have come to admire his elegant style, but they fear his fighting spirit.

In this respect Langer abides strictly by the fair play that is the spirit of the game. He relies on his own strength and ignores the weaknesses of others.

Down the fairway . . . Langer at work.
(Photo: Horstmüller)

He is not given to calling it a day. In Akron, Ohio, his ball landed in water and would have been declared unplayable by just about anyone else. But not by Bernhard Langer.

He took off his shoes and socks and waded into the pond to play the ball with apparent ease.

He is self-assured but would never dream of letting it show unduly, neither on the course nor off it, and says he never has any difficulty in remembering to be on his best behaviour.

Asked who he has modelled his game on, he names not the world's best but South Africa's Gary Player. (Gary Player, now past his best, was one of the top players in the world during the 1960s. He has twice won the British Open. He is one of only four players in recent years to take the British Open/PGA Masters double. The others were Tom Watson, Jack Nicklaus and Arnold Palmer. — Ed)

What impresses him about Player? His religion, for one. Langer too is a deeply religious man, believing in more than himself.

Golf is to a large extent a matter of concentration, which is Langer's strong point. He has concentrated on golf all his life.

Some might feel sorry for him. Others will simply admire him.

Monika Zimmermann
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 14 August 1982)

Continued from page 11

…el checks the casting, dialogue and …al version before giving its approval.

The annual programme is then approved by the TV programme directors … the regional broadcasting corporations.

During nationwide viewing hours in … 206 motion pictures were screened … ARD, as against 183 on ZDF, the Second Channel.

They included 48 films screened for the first time in Germany and a mere 40 repeats.

The desk has three regular slots a week to fill: 11 p.m. on Mondays, 8.15 p.m. on Fridays (peak viewing time, …) and 10 p.m. on Saturdays.

An additional 22 films for the whole family are screened on Saturday afternoons. At least once a month, at 9 p.m. on Sundays, special films are presented.

The desk arranges topics on which films are expected to concentrate; groups of films must at times be put together over the years.

Viewers are then shown a series of films from a certain country, about a certain actor and by a certain director. This year's specials include the work of French director Claude Chabrol and German actor Hans Albers.

The Frankfurt panel deals not only with the film business but also with TV and crime serials, such as *Dallas*.

Programme magazines have to order from Frankfurt additional information and still photos of the latest episode of, say, *Dallas* or *Unsere kleine Farm*.

Responsibility for the choice of films screened on Channel 3 and during regional viewing time lies with the film desks of individual regional corporations.

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 13 August 1982)